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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW WITH STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly determine that the Utah 
State Tax Commission, not the Uintah County Assessor, assesses 
and levies on oil, gas and mineral rights? The court reviews 
the district court's grant of summary judgment for 
correctness. Keith v. Mountain Resorts Development 2014 UT 32 
~16, 337 P.3d 213. 
2. Did the trial court correctly determine that severed 
mineral rights that were not assessed or levied by the county 
are not subject to the county tax sale? The court reviews the 
district court's grant of summary judgment for correctness. 
Keith v Mountain Resorts Development 2014 UT 32 ~16, 337 P.3d 
213. 
3. Did the trial court correctly determine that due 
process prevents the running of a statute of limitations on 
w;) tax titles when no notice was given to the Jordans of the 
assessment, the imposition of the taxes, the delinquency or 
the tax sale? The court reviews the district court's grant of 
summary judgment for correctness. Keith v Mountain Resorts 
Development 2014 UT 32 il6, 337 P.3d 213. 
4. Did the trial court correctly rule that Utah Code 
1 
Ann. §40-6-1 et seq., not Utah Code Ann. §40-1-12, provides 
the remedy for payment for oil and gas production if it is 
determined that Jensens own the oil and gas rights? The court 
reviews the district court's grant of a motion to dismiss for 
correctness. America West Bank LLC v State, 2014 UT 49 i7, 
342 P.3d 224. 
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9 is attached as Addendum 3. 
Utah Code Ann. §40-1-12 is attached as Addendum 4. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: Plaintiffs (herein referred to as 
Jordans) are descendants of Harvey and Edna Peterson, who 
homesteaded the subject property located in Uintah County, 
Utah in the early 1900s. The Jordans' predecessors eventually 
sold the surface rights, retaining the oil, gas and mineral 
rights. The Jordans leased their oil, gas and mineral rights 
and the third-party defendants drilled an oil and gas well on 
the property. Defendants (herein referred to as Jensens) are 
the present owners of the surface rights and claimed title to 
the oil and gas rights thru a tax sale. 
Jordans filed this lawsuit to quiet title to the oil, gas 
and mineral rights. Jensens answered, claiming title to the 
oil, gas and mineral rights based on a tax deed that was 
issued from a tax sale for 1995 unpaid taxes to Uintah County, 
2 
Utah. The assessment, levy and tax sale occurred after the 
oil, gas and mineral rights had been severed from the fee. 
Jensens also filed a counterclaim and third-party complaint 
against Third-Party Defendants, Axia Energy LLC, Stonegate 
Resources LLC and Wasatch Oil & Gas LLC {collectively referred 
to herein as Axia), which entities had interests in the oil, 
gas and mineral rights based on leases and drilling of an oil 
and gas well on the subject property. 
Proceedings Below: Jordans filed their complaint to quiet 
title on July 5, 2013. R. 1-17. The complaint alleged that 
the oil, gas and mineral rights were not assessed, having been 
severed from the surface, and, therefore, were not subject to 
the tax sale for the 1995 taxes. The complaint further 
alleged that no notice was given to Jordans or their 
predecessors of the tax, the delinquency or the sale as 
required by due process. Jensens filed their answer and 
counterclaim on August 9, 2013, seeking a declaratory judgment 
to quiet title to the oil, gas and mineral rights, alleging 
~ that Jordans' ownership was barred by the statute of 
limitations, claiming to have adversely possessed the mineral 
rights, asserting conversion and trespass and averring that 
Jordans had violated Utah Code Ann. §40-1-12 (wrongful removal 
of ore). R. 23-42. 
Jordans moved to dismiss the Jensens' cause of action 
3 
based on Utah Code Ann. §40-1-12. R. 49-51. That motion was 
briefed by the parties, and, after oral argument on October 
29, 2013, the court (Judge Petersen) granted the motion 
finding that the Jensens' remedy was under Utah Code Ann. §41-
6-1 et. seq. and dismissed that cause of action. R. 166-169, 
R. 2009. Addendum 2. 
Jensens then amended their counterclaim adding a third-
party complaint against the Axia entities, which had leased 
the oil, gas and mineral rights from Jordans or who had 
drilled the oil and gas well on the property. R. 170-172. 
After completing discovery, all parties filed motions for 
summary judgment. Oral argument was held on the motions for 
summary judgment on September 24, 2014 before Judge McClellan. 
At the oral argument, the parties' counsel agreed that the 
material facts were not in dispute. See pages 9 thru 12 of 
Transcript of the September 24, 2014 hearing, R. 2010. Prior 
to issuing his ruling, Judge McClellan recused himself after 
a potential conflict arose. The case was then assigned to 
Judge Samuel Chiara. 
Disposition at the Trial Court: Judge Chiara, after 
considering the memoranda submitted by the parties and the 
transcript of the September 24, 2014 hearing, issued his 
Ruling and Order on February 18, 2015. That Ruling and Order 
granted the motions for summary judgment filed by the Jordans 
4 
and Axia, and denied the Jensen Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Addendum 1, R. 1816-1834. 
FACTS 
The parties stipulated that the material facts were not 
disputed and that many of the facts listed by the parties in 
their memoranda were not material. September 24, 2014 hearing 
transcript pages 8 thru 11, R. 2010. Jensens' statement of 
~ facts in their brief includes many of the facts the parties 
agreed were not material to the issues before the court, and 
were facts not relied on by the court in entering its Ruling 
and Order. 
The trial court found that the following facts were 
undisputed and based its ruling on these facts. Addendum 1, R. 
1816-1834. 
1. The property that is the subject of this case 
consists of approximately 40 acres in Randlett, Utah, legally 
described as the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of 
Section 32, Township 7 South, Range 20 East, Salt Lake 
~ Meridian. 
2. On October 25, 1954, Olivia Jordan, Marie Robertson, 
and Caroline Kelley (the "Jordans") acquired the property. 
3. The Jordans sold the property to Jonathan Anthony 
Andrews, reserving the oil, gas and mineral rights. The deed 
is dated February 3, 1995, and recorded March 15, 1995, at 
5 
Book 592, Page 95, in the Uintah County Recorder's Office. 
4. The real property tax notice for the 1995 taxes on 
the property was mailed by Uintah County to Olivia Jordan c/o 
Jonathan Anthony Andrews, P.O. Box 5451, Gainesville, Fl. 
5. The 1995 taxes were not timely paid. 
6. The 1996 tax notice was sent to Jonathan Anthony 
Andrews, at P.O. Box 851981, Richardson, Texas. Those taxes 
in the amount of $32.42 were paid on November 21, 1996. 
7. The 1997 tax notice was sent to Jonathan Anthony 
Andrews at the Richardson, Texas address. The 1997 taxes in 
the amount of $35.92 were paid on December 10, 1997. 
8. On November 17, 1997, $33.05 was paid on the 1995 
taxes. After payment on penalties and interest, there was a 
balance owing of $8.94. 
9. The 1998 and 1999 tax notices were sent to Jonathan 
Anthony Andrews at the Richardson, Texas P.O. Box. The taxes 
for 1998 and 1999 were not paid. 
10. For failing to pay the real property taxes assessed 
for the 1995, 1998, and 1999 tax years, resulting in a past 
due amount of $167 .19, Uintah County seized and sold the 
property on May 25, 2000. 
11. The record of delinquent taxes prepared by the 
treasurer and recorder states that the date of the tax lien is 
January 16, 1996, and date of delinquency is January 16, 1996. 
6 
All parties agree this date is incorrect, and likely due 
to a typographical error. The taxes for the 1996 year were 
paid. The record should have indicated a tax lien date and 
delinquency date of January 1, 1995, as there remained a 
balance due on the 1995 taxes. {This is a footnote to 
paragraph 11 in the court's Ruling and Order.) 
12. The assessment and levy for the 1995 tax year did not 
occur until on or after May 12, 1995. 
13. No notice was ever given to the Jordans of the 
assessment of 1995, the failure to pay the taxes, or the tax 
sale. 
14. On May 25, 2000, Uintah County executed a tax deed 
concerning the property. The grantee was Quality Remediation 
Services ("QRS"), which paid the County $6,000.00. 
15. On December 13, 2000, QRS executed a warranty deed 
concerning the property. The Jensens were the grantees, and 
paid $5,500.00 to QRS. 
16. In a January 2001 Real Property Transfer Survey 
~ Standard Land Questionnaire, the Jensens indicated they paid 
fair market value for the property, and that the sale did not 
include the mineral rights. 
17. Prior to March 2013, the Jensens never asserted a 
claim to own the mineral rights in the property. 
18. Since 1995, the Jordans have periodically leased the 
7 
oil, gas and mineral rights. 
19. In May 2011, Stonegate entered into oil and gas 
leases with the successors in interest to the Jordans. In 
August of 2011, Stonegate assigned the working interest in 
these leases to Axia, reserving for itself and Wasatch a 
royalty interest. 
20. In November 2011, the Jensens entered into a Surface 
Use Agreement and Grant of Easements, allowing Axia to conduct 
exploration and drilling operations on the property. 
21. Over time, Axia has paid the Jensens $21,182.00 under 
the Surface Use Agreement. 
22. Axia paid all the taxes associated with the mineral 
rights in 2012 and 2013, totaling $84,878.32. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The assessing, levying and taxing of oil, gas and 
mineral rights are the responsibility of the Utah State Tax 
Commission. Therefore, the Jordans' oil, gas and mineral 
rights were not subject to the tax lien or the tax sale by 
Uintah County, Utah. 
2. The Uintah County Assessor knew that she was not 
responsible to assess and levy on oil, gas and mineral rights, 
especially when they have been severed from the fee. It is 
undisputed that the Uintah County Assessor did not assess the 
Jordans' oil, gas and mineral rights. The law in Utah has long 
8 
held that property interests that are not assessed and levied 
are not subject to the tax lien or the tax sale. 
3. The United States Supreme Court, beginning with the 
case of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 
306 (1950), has held that, if due process requirements of 
notice are not afforded to the property owner, then the tax 
sale is void and state statutes of limitation do not bar a 
subsequent challenge to the tax sale. 
4. Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9 provides the remedies for the 
Jensens, if it is determined that they were not paid for oil 
and gas production in which they owned an interest, rather 
than Utah Code Ann. §40-1-12 regarding wrongful removal of 
ore. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Utah State Tax Commission not County Assessors 
Assess and Levy on Oil, Gas and Mineral Rights. 
Jensens first argue that the Uintah County Assessor had 
a constitutional and statutory duty to assess all oil, gas and 
mineral rights in the county, even those with no value, those 
not discovered and those severed from the surface estate. Then 
Jensens argue that, even though it is undisputed that the 
Uintah County Assessor did not assess the Jordans' severed 
oil, gas and mineral rights, those oil, gas and mineral rights 
were still subject to the county tax sale. 
The first flaw in Jensens' argument is that the Utah 
9 
State Tax Commission assesses oil, gas and mineral rights, not 
the County Assessors. Utah Code Ann. §59-2-201(1) (a) (v) and 
Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v Robbins 116 Utah 314, 209 P.2d 739 
(Utah 1949). The Uintah County Assessor was fully aware of her 
duties when she did not assess the severed oil, gas and 
mineral rights or any other oil, gas and mineral rights in 
1995. R.239-244. 
To adopt the Jensens' argument would require this Court 
to ignore the Constitution of Utah and the statutes regarding 
taxation of minerals. It would also require the Court to 
develop a methodology of how to value unknown minerals, and 
would change the historical valuation and taxing of oil and 
gas reserves. Such a change would also impact (1) assessors 
who would then be required to locate all owners of severed 
mineral rights, (2) owners of severed mineral rights alleged 
to have been sold at tax sale due to the sale of the surface 
property, (3) owners of mineral rights who apparently would be 
owing years of unpaid taxes, and (4) those who have developed 
mineral rights, as that will place a cloud on all severed 
mineral rights. 
Jordans, pursuant to Rule 24 ( i) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, further adopt the arguments on this issue 
by amicus, The Utah State Tax Commission, the Utah Farm Bureau 
et. al. and by Appellee Axia. 
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II. The Severed Oil, Gas and Mineral Rights in This Case 
Were Not Assessed Nor Levied by the Uintah County Assessor. 
Therefore, the Severed Oil, Gas and Mineral Rights in This 
Case Were Not Subject to the Tax Lien. 
In the event this Court determines that the Uintah County 
Assessor had the duty to assess and levy on the mineral 
rights, Jensens' argument that even though the oil, gas and 
mineral rights were severed from the fee estate, and not 
assessed or levied on by the Uintah County Assessor, they were 
still subject to the tax lien for the taxes for 1995 thru 
1999, is counter to decades of Utah law. Utah law is clear 
that before there is a lien to attach and relate back, the 
property must first be assessed and levied. See Gillmor v 
Dale 75 P. 932, 934 (Utah 1904) and Tintic Undine Mining Co. 
v. Ercanbrack, 93 Utah 561, 74 P.2d 1184, 1189 (Utah 1938). 
In Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169 P.2d 781 (Utah 1946), the 
Court held that 
If property rights which are not included in an 
assessment are sold or extinguished by a tax sale, 
there would be a taking of property without due 
process of law. 
~ Id. at 786. See also H.C. Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, 
110, 152 P.3d 312 {Utah 2007) ("Assessment is the basis of the 
tax title and only that interest which was properly assessed 
can be sold."); West Valley City Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 852 
P.2d 1000, 1003 (Utah 1993) {"The date of assessment and levy, 
not the statutory lien date of January 1st, is the relevant 
11 
date for determining whether property is within the reach of 
a taxing entity's power for the purpose of assessing, levying 
and collecting taxes on the property."). 
Jensens, in an attempt to distinguish the factually 
similar case of Huntington City v. Peterson, 30 Utah 2d. 408, 
518 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1974), claim that the holding applies only 
to tax exempt municipal corporations. A reading of that case 
shows that was not the basis for the holding in the case, but 
rather was the position of the dissent. The holding was stated 
as follows: "[T]he respondent has not shown that the 
assessment and levy of the tax for the year 1959 were made 
prior to the time when the city acquired its title." Id. at 
412. Cases not involving government entities have reached the 
same conclusion. 
In Mason v. Loveless, 2001 Ut. App. 145, 24 P.3d 997, the 
court held that a boundary by acquiescence claim was not 
extinguished by a tax sale, because the holder of the claim 
was not assessed, and because it would violate due process of 
law. Id. at~~ 15 and 16. In Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169 
P.2d 781 (Utah 1946), the court held that a tax sale does not 
remove easements, building restrictions, or other equitable 
covenants. There, the court stated, "If the person assessed as 
owner had no title to the easement, certainly the tax sale 
could not pass title thereto; the property assessed and the 
12 
property conveyed must be the same." Id. at 786. See also 
Tintic Undine Mining Co. v. Ercanbrack et al., 93 Utah 561, 74 
P.2d 1184 (Utah 1938). 
Jensens' reliance on Sawey v. Barr, 52 N.M. 358, 198 P.2d 
801 (N.M. 1948), is misplaced. The holding in that case was 
based on the failure to record the deed, so that the assessor 
was aware that the minerals had been severed. The law in New 
Mexico is that the mineral estate is assessed separately. See 
Kaye v. Cooper Grocery Co., 63 N.M. 36, 312 P.2d 798 (N.M. 
1957). See also Lien v. Simon, 522 F. Supp. 712 (D. Mont. 
1981) . 
III. Jensen's Statute of Limitations Argument Fails 
Because the Oil, Gas and Mineral Rights Were Never Part of the 
Tax Sale. Even if the Oil, Gas and Mineral Rights Were Subject 
to the Tax Sale, the Tax Deed is Void as a Violation of Due 
Process. 
1. Due Process Reguires that Jordans Receive Notice of 
the Tax Sale. 
The trial court found that lack of any notice to Jordans 
of the taxes or of the sale violated due process and did not 
prevent the Jordans from challenging the tax title. Addendum 
1 pages 11-14, R. 1826 - 1829. The trial court relied on Jones 
v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006) and footnote 14 of Frederiksen 
v. LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah 1981), where Justice Oaks 
stated, "We expressly reserve opinion on whether the special 
statute of limitations could protect a tax title acquired by 
means repugnant to fundamental fairness or whether such an 
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application of the statute would exceed the limits of 
statutory intent or constitutional permissibility." 
Jensens, while conceding that Jordans received no notice 
and had a "slam dunk" due process violation, continue to 
assert that the Jordans cannot challenge the Jensens' title 
since 4 years had passed since the sale in 2000. Essentially, 
Jensens argue that the state statute of limitations trumps 
constitutional rights. The United States Supreme Court has 
rejected that argument. 
First, it should be noted that if this Court agrees that 
the minerals were not sold at the tax sale, then this argument 
is moot as the Jordans make no claim to the surface. In the 
event the court finds that the mineral rights were subject to 
the tax sale, that sale was void for violating due process and 
the statute of limitations does not run against a void sale. 
The United States Supreme Court has rejected Jensens' 
argument, that statutes of limitation trump due process, on 
several occasions. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), the Court ruled that before any 
action could affect one's interest in property, the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that 
notice be given "reasonably calculated, under the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency 
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
14 
objections.n Id. at 314. 
Then, in Schroeder v City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 
(1962), the City of New York condemned and diverted water 
rights that impacted property owned by Schroeder. Notice of 
the condemnation was given by posting and publication. Actual 
notice was not given to Schroeder. The statute provided that 
any action to seek damages was barred by a three year statute 
of limitations. Schroeder did not file her claim for damages 
until after three years had passed. The City of New York, like 
the Jensens, claimed that Schroeder's action was barred by the 
three year statute of limitations, even if she did not receive 
notice. The United States Supreme Court disagreed, finding 
that the notice was insufficient under Mullane and reversed 
the decision of the New York Court of Appeals that held that 
the claim was barred. Id. at 214. 
Following Schroeder, the court again addressed this issue 
in Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983). 
In Mennonite, the county posted notice of the tax sale and 
~ published it for three weeks. After the tax sale, an owner, 
occupant or lienholder had a two year period to redeem. If the 
property was not redeemed, then the purchaser, at the sale, 
received fee simple absolute title. Adams purchased at the 
sale and waited the two years. Adams then filed suit to quiet 
title, claiming, like the Jensens, that he owned the property. 
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The Indiana courts found for Adams. On appeal, the United 
States Supreme Court again held that the notice did not meet 
constitutional requirements and that the two year statute of 
limitations did not bar the claim, and reversed the decision 
of the Indiana courts. 
Jones v. Flowers followed in 2006, again ruling that the 
State may not take property and sell it for unpaid taxes 
without giving the owner notice and opportunity for a hearing. 
The decision of the Arkansas court upholding the sale was 
reversed. 
In support of their position, Jens ens cite Terry v. 
Anderson, 95 U.S. 628 (1877) and Saranac Land and Timber Co. 
v. Comptroller of New York, 177 U.S. 318 (1900). Neither of 
those cases supports the Jensens' argument. Those cases 
involved the question of reasonableness of the limitation time 
period. Neither involved facts where there was no notice. 
Jensens also rely on Swanson v. Pontralo, 238 Iowa 693, 27 
N.W.2d 21 (1947). Swanson was decided before Mullane v. 
Hanover Bank and its progeny were decided, and does not 
discuss lack of notice and due process impacts on the validity 
of the tax deed. The case does point out that jurisdictional 
defects would be unconstitutional and the deed void. The Iowa 
Courts have since held that, without notice, the deed is void 
and not subject to the running of the statute of limitations. 
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Larsen v. Cady, 274 N.W.2d 907, 909 (Iowa 1979) and Robinson 
v. First American Title Ins., 755 N.W.2d 144 (Iowa App. 2008). 
See also Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope, 485 
U.S. 478, 485-486 (1988). 
The Mullane case and the cases following Mullane show 
that due process is not trumped by statutes of limitation. It 
is conceded by Jensens that Jordans were not given notice, and 
that the due process rights were not followed. Therefore, the 
statute of limitations relied on by Jensens does not bar the 
Jordan's rights to contest the tax deed. 
2. Jensens' Analysis of Whether a Deed is Void or 
Voidable is Incorrect. 
The test for whether documents, such as deeds, are void 
or voidable "is whether they offend public policy." Bangerter 
v. Petty, 2010 UT App 49, ilO, 228 P.3d 1250, citing Ockey v. 
Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, 189 P.3d 51 (Utah 2008). Failure to give 
notice renders the document void. See e.g. Migliore v. 
Livingston Financial, LLC, 2015 UT 9, '1!26, 347 P.3d 394 
(judgment void when no notice given). The Mullane, Schroeder, 
Mennonite, and Jones cases hold that the failure to give 
notice offends the public policy set forth in the Constitution 
of the United States, and that the documents involved in those 
case were void. Surely, those cases were not remanded to have 
the lower courts say, "Oh well, it was an irregularity and 
therefore only voidable." Those cases were remanded to set 
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aside the unconstitutional act, regardless of passage of any 
statute of limitations. See Luser v. Bank of Chelsea, 730 P.2d 
506 (OK 1986), holding that under Mullane and Mennonite notice 
was a jurisdictional requirement, Id. at i13; that notice in 
that case was insufficient, Id. at i18; and therefore, the tax 
resale deed was void, Id. at i19. 
Jensens' reliance on Lake Canal Reservoir v. Beethe, 227 
P.3d 882 (Colo. 2010) is also misplaced. Colorado, in a case 
factually similar to this case, has ruled that, when mineral 
rights are severed, those mineral rights must be separately 
assessed to be taxed. Mitchell v. Espinosa, 125 Colo. 267, 
274, 243 P.2d 412 (1952). See also Webermeier v. Pace, 37 
Colo. App. 546, 552 P.2d 1021 (Colo. App. 1976). The failure 
to assess the mineral rights results in the treasurer not 
having jurisdiction to tax the mineral rights and the deed is 
void. Mitchell at 276. See also Lake Canal Reservoir at 889 
(holding that a tax deed is void if the taxing authority 
lacked authority or jurisdiction to issue the deed); Kaye v. 
Cooper Grocery Co., 63 N.M. 36, 312 P.2d 798 (N.M. 1957) 
(holding that public policy requires that severed minerals are 
assessed separate from the fee). In the case before the Court, 
the deed is void and not subject to the statute of 
limitations. 
3. The Recording of the Tax Deed Did Not Give Jordans' 
Constitutionally Reguired Notice. 
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Jensens, while conceding that the Jordans did not receive 
due process notice as required by the Mullane line of cases, 
still argue that since the tax deed was recorded the Jordans 
had constructive notice of the tax sale and that met the due 
process requirements. This argument has been rejected by the 
United States Supreme Court. Mennonite Board of Missions v 
Adams 462 U.S. 791 (1983) holding that constructive notice 
provided by the documents in the public record and publication 
must be supplemented by mailed notice or personal service. 
Id. 798. See Also Jones v Flowers 547 U.S. 220 (2006) holding 
that publication and a mailing that was returned was 
insufficient that notice must be "reasonably calculated to 
reach the intended recipient. Id. 226. 
To adopt the Jensens' argument would require every land 
owner to periodically go to the county recorders office of 
each county where they owned an interest in land and conduct 
a title check to see if anything adverse had been filed. That 
is not the purpose or requirement of the recording statute. 
~ The purpose of the recording statute is to protect a buyer of 
real property by giving them the opportunity to check the 
status of title before they purchase real property and to be 
able to rely on what is recorded. Pioneer Builders Co. of Nev. 
v KDA Corp. 2012 UT 74, ~77, 292 P.3d 672. 
Jensens do not point out that Jordans' title was recorded 
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years before Jensens acquired their claim to title and 
therefore it is Jensens who were on notice of Jordans' title. 
Jensens, when they purchased the property from QRS, should 
have followed common practice of title companies and checked 
the status of the title at the recorder's office. They would 
have then determined that the mineral rights had been severed. 
The two cases relied on by Jensens, Kemmerer v Brigham Young 
Univ. 723 F.2d 54 (1983) and Shelledy v Lore 836 P.2d 786 
(Utah 1992), also involved parties that had purchased the 
property after the tax sale and therefore like the Jensens had 
notice of the sale. 
IV. Utah Code Ann. 40-6-1 et seq. Governs Oil and Gas 
Production and Payment for that Production. 
Jensens' complaint alleged that Jordans entered into Oil 
and Gas Leases with EnCana Oil & Gas and received bonus 
payments when signing the leases, and that Jordans permitted 
EnCana's successors (Third-Party Defendants) to drill an oil 
and gas well and then extract and sell oil and gas from the 
property. R. 23. Jensens further alleged that Jordans' leasing 
and the drilling of the oil and gas well, and the extracting 
of oil and gas, violated Utah Code Ann. §40-1-12 (wrongful 
removal of ores), and that Jensens were entitled to treble 
damages. R. 23. 
The trial court (Judge Peterson) dismissed that claim, 
finding that Utah Code Ann. §40-6-1 et seq., as it related to 
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oil and gas production, specifically addressed payment and 
remedies for oil and gas production and therefore, §40-6-1 et 
seq. provided the Jensens their remedy, if any, not §40-1-12. 
The trial court held "that Chapter 1 has no applicability 
since the passage of Chapter 6 to oil and gas." R. 2009 
Transcript of 10-29-2013 hearing page 18, and R.166, Addendum 
2. 
The statute, Utah Code Ann. §40-6-1 et seq., governing 
oil and gas drilling, was established in 1955 and then was 
amended in 1983. That legislation established the Board and 
Division of Oil, Gas and Mining. The legislature declared that 
it was in the pubic interest to foster, encourage and promote 
the development and production of oil and gas in the State of 
Utah. Utah Code Ann. §40-6-1. See also Bennion v. Utah State 
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, 675 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1983) 
and Cowling v. Board of Oil Gas and Mining, 830 P.2d 220, 224-
5 {Utah 1991). That statute provides for the establishment of 
drilling units, pooling of interests and payment of royalties 
~ and costs to non-consenting oil and gas owners. Utah Code Ann. 
§§40-6-6 and 40-6-6.5. Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9 {Addendum 3) 
supplies remedies for oil and gas owners who are not paid for 
production of oil and gas. See e.g. Bennion v. Graham 
Resources Inc., 849 P.2d 569 (Utah 1993). Those remedies 
include the right to receive monthly royalty payments, to hold 
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in an interest bearing escrow account disputed payments (as in 
this case) , to have the board investigate and hold agency 
hearings, penal ties and accountings. See Addendum 3. The 
trial court correctly decided that Jensens' remedies are 
governed by those provisions, not the statute regarding 
wrongful removal of ore. 
The rules of statutory construction also show that Utah 
Code Ann. §40-6-9 regarding payment of oil and gas proceeds 
applies in this case rather then the ore statute. It is a 
general principle of statutory construction that if two 
statutes may apply to an issue that the more specific statute 
applies. R.P. v. K.S.W., 2014 UT App 38, fn.9, 320 P.3d 1084, 
Flowell Electric Association Inc. v. Rhodes Pump LLC, 2015 UT 
87, 110, P.3d . In this case, Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9 
specifically applies to the question of what remedy Jensens 
have for unpaid royalties, if it is determined that they own 
an interest in the oil and gas rights which are the subject of 
this case. 
Finally, the term ore does not include oil and gas. The 
plain meaning of the statute must be considered. Archuleta v. 
St. Marks Hosp., 2009 UT 36, ~8, 238 P.3d 1044. The dictionary 
definition of ore is a compound of metal and some other 
substance. Sukut Construction Inc. v. Rimrock CA LLC, 199 Cal. 
App. 817, 825 (2011) (citing Webster's Dictionary). Further, 
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the context of the statute is instructive. Utah Code Ann. §40-
1-12 is included in the Mining Claims statute. Black's Law 
Dictionary (1968) defines "mining claim" as "[a] parcel of 
land, containing precious metal in its soil or rock, and 
appropriated by an individual, according to established rules 
.... " Utah Code Ann. §40-1-1 specifically addresses "lode 
mining claim[s]", setting forth metes and bounds requirements 
"along the vein or lode," which requirements have no 
applicability to the recovery of oil and gas which is located 
in pools often many thousands of feet below the surface and 
may be located in various sections thus creating the need for 
drilling units and pooling. Utah Code Ann. §40-1-12 has no 
application to the drilling for and extraction of oil and gas 
which is governed by Chapter 6. Again, Chapter 6 provides the 
remedies available for Jensens in the event it were determined 
that they own the oil and gas rights. 
CONCLUS:ION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellees Jordans respectfully 
~ request that the Court affirm the trial court's decision as to 
all issues before the Court on appeal. 
DATED this-¼ day of January, 2016. 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
James Harvey Jordan, Trustee of the James H. 
Jordan Revocable Trust dated June 1, 2007, 
Martha Jordan Boright, Mary Edna Jordan, 
Michael C. Kelley, and Jary Anne Kelley, 
Trustee of the Kelley Joint Trust dated 
January 7, 2013, Gary B. Kelley, Norma 
Stroud Dickey, Mara Beth Hamer, Jan 
Rhodes as Trustee of the Revocable Rhodes 
Family Living Trust dated April 19, 2005, 
Wendy Sue Pack, Craig McSorley, Deborah J. 




Eddie R. Jensen and Ly-Thi Jensen, 
Defendants/Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs. 
Eddie R. Jensen and Ly-Thi Jensen, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Axia Energy, LLC, Stonegate Resources, 
LCC, Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
RULING AND ORDER . 
Case No. 130800084 
Judge SAMUEL P. CHIARA 
This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants' Motion for 
1 
• • 
Summary Judgment; the Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs/Third-Party Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment; and the Third-Party Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court heard oral argument on the Motions on September 24, 2014. The Court has 
thoroughly reviewed the arguments of counsel, the Motions, the supplemental pleadings, and the 
relevant case law and statutes. This Ruling and Order will resolve all three of the pending 
Motions for Summary Judgment. 
Initially, the Court recognizes the passage of time in issuing this Ruling and Order. 
Unfortunately, the necessary recusal of Judge Peterson, followed much later by the recusal of 
Judge McClellan, as well as the difficulty of the issues, resulted in a longer delay than is typical. 
The Court thanks the parties and counsel for their patience. The Court would also like to 
recognize the exceptional quality of each party's arguments and written briefs. The level of 
professionalism all sides displayed was outstanding. The quality of the legal work is very high. 
The arguments are well reasoned and thorough, which made the decision difficult, but also left 
the Court confident the parties have accurately presented the full scope of the law dealing with 
these issues. 
Undisputed Material Facts 
1. The property that is the subject of this case consists of approximately 40 acres in 
Randlett, Utah, legally described as the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of 
Section 32, Township 7 South, Range 20 East, Salt Lake Meridian. 
2. On October 25, 1954, Olivia Jordan, Marie Robertson, and Caroline Kelley (the 
"J ordans '') acquired the property. 






mineral rights.' The deed is dated February 3, 1995, and recorded March 15, 1995, at 
Book 592, Page 95, in the Uintah County Recorder's Office. 
4. The real property tax notice for the 1995 taxes on the property was mailed by Uintah 
County to Olivia Jordan c/o Jonathan Anthony Andrews, P.O. Box 5451, Gainsville, Fl. 
32602. 
S. The 199S taxes were not timely paid. 
6. The 1996 tax notice was sent to Jonathan Anthony Andrews, at P.O. Box 851981, 
Richardson, Texas. Those taxes in the amount of $32.42 were paid on November 21, 
1996. 
7. The 1997 tax notice was sent to Jonathan Anthony Andrews at the Richardson, Texas 
address. The 1997 taxes in the amount of$3S.92 were paid on December 10, 1997. 
8. On November 17, 1997, $33.05 was paid on the 1995 taxes. After payment on penalties 
and interest, there was a balance owing of $8.94. 
9. The 1998 and 1999 tax notices were sent to Johnathan Anthony Andrews at the 
Richardson, Texas P.O. Box. The taxes for 1998 and 1999 were not paid. 
10. For failing to pay the real property taxes assessed for the 1995, 1998, and 1999 tax years, 
resulting in a past due amount of $167 .19, Uintah County seized and sold the property on 
May 25, 2000. 
11. The record of delinquent taxes prepared by the treasurer and recorded states that the date 
of the tax lien is January 16, 19961, and date of delinquency is January 16, 1996. 
1All parties agree this date is incorrect, and likely due to a typographical error. The taxes 
for the 1996 year were paid. The record should have indicated a tax lien date and delinquency 





12. · The assessment and levy for the 1995 tax year did not occur until on or after May 12, 
199S. 
13. No notice was ever given to the Jordans of the assessment of 199S, the failure to pay the 
taxes, or the tax sale. 
14. On May 25, 2000, Uintah County executed a tax deed concerning the property. The 
grantee was Quality Remediation Services ("QRS"), who paid the County $6,000.00. 
IS. On December 13, 2000, QRS executed a warranty deed concerning the property. The 
Jensens were the grantees, and paid $5,500.00 to QRS. 
16. In a January 2001 Real Property Transfer Survey Standard Land Questionnaire the 
Jensens indicated they paid fair market value for the property, and that the sale did not 
include the mineral rights. 
17. Prior to March 2013, the Jensens never asserted a claim to own the ·mineral rights in the 
property. 
18. Since 1995, the Jordans have periodically leased the oil, gas, and mineral rights. 
19. In May 2011, Stonegate entered into oil and gas leases with the successors in interest to 
the Jordans. In August of 2011, Stonegate assigned the working interest in these leases to 
Axia, reserving for itself and Wasatch a royalty interest. 
20. In November 2011, the Jensens entered into a Surface Use Agreement and Grant of 
Easements, allowing Axia to conduct exploration and drilling operations on the property. 
21. Over time, Axia has paid the Jensens $21,182 under the Swface Use Agreement. 









Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. 
Carbon County, 80S P.2d 789, 791 (Utah App. 1991); Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The facts and 
evidence are viewed in a light most favorable to the· nonmoving party. America Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950,957 (Utah App. 1989). 
The Motions concern competing claims to title of the oil, gas, and mineral estate. There 
is no dispute of material fact. Therefore, the issue can be determined as a matter of law. 
I. Whether Uintah County's t 995 general assessment included trucing the mineral interest? 
The first issue is whether the Jordans' oil, gas, and mineral rights were severed from the 
surface estate and not assessed or levied on by Uintah County in 199S. 
The Jordans2 argue that the mineral estate was reserved at the time of conveyance of the 
surface rights to Mr. Andrews on February 3, 1995. The Uintah County Assesso~ assessed the 
property on May 22, 199S. Consequently, the Jordans argue that the County Assessor did not 
assess the mineral rights because the mineral estate had been severed by that time. Because the 
~ County Assessor did not assess the mineral rights, the Jordans argue there was no levy. 
The Jensens argue that pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 59-2-103 the 1995 tax assessment 
occurred on January 1, 1995, before the February 3, 199S, severance. The Jensens argue that the 
2 The Jordans and Axia argue for the same result, and largely offer the same arguments 
and cite to the same case law in their separate Motions and separate replies. For clarity and 
brevity, the Court will refer to the Jordans when discussing both the Jordans' and Axia's 
arguments and positions. 
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lien for the 199S unpaid taxes attached as of January 1, 1995. As a consequence, the Jensens 
argue that the mineral rights were levied and properly passed by tax deed at the 2000 tax sale. 
"Tax sale proceedings are predicated and founded upon failure to pay a tax assessed 
against the property, and, therefore, no validity can attach to any sale except of the property 
assessed and delinquent for failure to pay the tax levied on the assessment as made." Tintle 
Undlne Mining Co. v. Ercanbrack, 14 P.2d 1184, 1189 (Utah 1938). "If property rights which 
are not included in an assessment are sold or extinguishable by a tax sale, there would be a taking 
of property without due process of law." Hayesv. Gibbs, 169 P.2d 781, 786 (Utah 1946). If 
Uintah County did not assess the mineral estate, the mineral estate was not subject to the tax lien 
and could not pass at a tax sale. Therefore, the date of assessment, and whether Uintah County 
had the power to assess the mineral estate, are critical. 
Utah Code Ann. § S9-2-103(a) states: "All tangible taxable property ... shall be assessed 
and weed at a uniform rate on the basis of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless 
otherwise provided by law." Also, "[a] tax upon real property is a lien against the property 
assessed ... [and] shall attach on January 1 of each year." Utah Code Ann.§ 59-2-1325. 
Notwithstanding, the issue of when the date of assessment and levy occurs has been 
authoritatively decided in Utah. In Huntington City v. Peterson, S 18 P .2d 1246 (Utah 197 4), 
Huntington City bought a parcel ofland on April 7, 1959. The Emery County assessor assessed 
the parcel of land, and the levy for tax was made in August 1959. No notice of the tax 
assessment was given to Huntington City. The party assessed the 1959 taxes did not pay the 
taxes and the property was sold at a tax sale. The Utah Supreme Court quieted title to 
Huntington City, holding that the assessment occurred after Huntington City acquired the 
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property and that no tax lien attached as a consequence. 
In Gillmor v. Dale, 1S P.932 (Utah 1904), the Utah Supreme Court held that a property 
tax "does not become a lien on real estate until the rate thereof is fixed, and the tax levied .•. " 
because "[t]he city council was not authorized ... to levy a tax, except on property within its 
corporate limits, and any levy upon property not within such limits is without authority and 
void." Id. at 934. 
More recently, the Utah Supreme Court in the case of West Valley City Corp. v. Salt Lake 
City, 8S2 P .2d 1000, 1003 (Utah 1993 ), found: 
The date of assessment and levy, not the statutory lien date of January 1st, is the 
relevant date for determining whether property is within the reach of a taxing entity's 
power for the purpose of assessing, levying and collecting taxes on the property. 
See also H.C. Massey v. Griffiths, 1S3 P.3d 312,110 (Utah 2007)("Assessment is the basis of the 
tax title and only that interest which was properly assessed can be sold.") 
The Jensens contend that Utah Code Ann.§§ 59-2-1325 and 59-2-103 dictate the lien 
date as January 1, of the year the property was assessed. The Jensens also attempt to distinguish 
the above line of cases by arguing that those cases merely apply to property transferred to a tax 
exempt entity. The Jensens argue the reason for treating a tax exempt entity differently is a tax 
exempt entity would have no reason to believe that they would be taxed. Therefore, selling a tax 
exempt entity's property for failure to pay truces would be improper. 
The Jensens• argument that a tax lien attaches on January 1, regardless of the date of 
assessment and levy, is not without support. The dissenting opinion in Huntington, 518 P .2d at 
1249-50 (Henriod, J ., dissenting), also insisted that a tax lien attaches on January 1 pursuant to 
statute. While the dissenting opinion is well reasoned, the majority rejected it. This Court is 
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required to follow binding precedent, which is the majority opinion. 
Further, if the above line of cases only apply to tax exempt entities, that qualification was 
not stated explicitly in the holdings, and the reasoning to treat tax exempt entities differently in 
these scenarios was not explained. If the reason is, as the Jensens suggest, that tax exempt 
entities would have no reason to suspect tax liability, the same reasoning would apply to the facts 
here. The Jordans also had no reason to suspect a tax liability to the County because: (1) their 
mineral interest was severed prior to taxation; (2) the mineral interest was non-productive; (3) 
counties are not empowered to tax a severed mineral interest under the Constitution and the Act; 
(4) Uintah County did not believe that they assessed these mineral interests in 1995; (S) the 
Jordans had never had their mineral estate assessed separately prior to 1995;and (6) the Uintah 
County Record of Delinquent Taxes showed the wrong lien date for the property. Based on these 
factors, the Jordans would have had no reason to believe that their mineral interest was taxed by 
Uintah County for the 199S year. 
Because the property was not assessed by the Uintah County assessor until after the 
February 3, 1995, severance date, the mineral estate was not assessed by the County. Uintah 
County only assessed the surface rights. The tax lien did not attach to the mineral rights. 
Consequently, authority and jurisdiction to sell the mineral rights were not acquired by the 
County, and the mineral interests were not sold at the May 2000 tax sale. 
II. Whether Uintah County had the authority to assess the severed mineral interest? 
The Jordans argue Uintah County does not have the authority to separately assess, levy, 




seq., which directs that counties tax the surface interest, and the Utah State Tax Commission 
taxes the mineral interest. The Jordans also cite to case law which hold the same. See Telonis v. 
Staley, 144 P.2d 513, 515 (Utah 1943)("Where there is separate ownership of the respective 
rights [refening to severed surface and mineral rights], separate levy and separate sale would 
necessarily follow .... "); Kanawha & Hocking Coal & Coke Co. v. Carbon County, 535 P .2d 
1139, 1140 (Utah 1975)(holding Utah State Tax Commission taxes mineral rights and counties 
tax surface rights). 
The Jensens argue Uintah County was required to tax the mineral interests as part of the 
general assessment. The Jensens argue that "all tangible property in the State that is not exempt . 
. . shall be" assessed and taxed. Utah Constitution, Article XIII, Section 2. Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-2-301, counties are required to assess all property not assessed by the Utah State 
Tax Commission. The Jensens argue the Commission is obligated to assess only valuable 
mineral deposits. The Jensens argue that the mineral estate was not valuable until 2012 when the 
mine started producing. Therefore, the Jensens argue Uintah County was required to assess the 
mineral estate in 1995 when it was not valuable, or at least, had not had a value applied to it. 
Admittedly, this is a difficult issue. On one hand, if it is true that the Commission is only 
required to tax producing or valuable mineral interests, and counties are only authorized to tax 
surface rights, then there is seemingly a gap left that allows unproductive mineral interests to go 
untaxed. Although those unproductive mineral interests are not producing, in many instances 
they perhaps have some undetennined value. On the other hand, if counties are required to tax 
non-producing mineral interests, the practical problem of detennining the value of an 
wiproductive mineral interest arises. Additionally, Uintah County does not attempt to determine 
9 
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a value or apply a tax rate to severed mineral interests. Neither does Uintah County send 
separate tax bills, notices, or notices of sales to owners of severed mineral interests. Following 
Jensen,s reasoning, severed unproductive mineral interests have unknowingly passed at 
numerous tax sales. Because Uintah County does not notify owners of severed mineral interests 
of assessments or tax sales, it is likely that many owners of severed mineral interests find 
themselves in an identical position to the Jordans. Finally, where surface and mineral interests 
have been severed, such as is likely the case with hundreds or even thousands of parcels in 
Uintah County, the county,s general assessment results in only one tax·bill even though there are 
at least two owners. That tax bill is uniformly assessed to and paid by the surface owner. Would 
mineral interest owners be liable to pay some portion of the tax where the mineral interest is 
nonproductive and not otherwise taxed? How would the property owners divide the bill? What 
would happen if one party paid the full amount of the bill? 
The Court detennines that undeveloped or undiscovered minerals underlying a piece of 
property are akin to an intangible asset. As an intangible asset, the undiscovered minerals fall 
outside the scope of Article XIII, Section 2, of the Utah Constitution, and are not subject to 
taxation. It follows that counties are not responsible for determining the value of undeveloped or 
undiscovered minerals and are not authorized or required tot~ valueless property. The Jensens 
provide no support for their argument that counties are responsible for taxing valueless property, 
and the Court is not aware of any. Valueless property cannot be taxed. Applying a tax rate to 
property that has either no market value or an undetermined market value is pointless because the 
resulting tax obligation would be zero. Valuable mineral interests whose fair market value can 
be determined are required by statute and the Utah Constitution to be assessed by the Utah State 
10 
• • 
Tax Commission. Therefore, Uintah County did not have the authority to assess the severed 
mineral estate in 1995, as the mineral estate at that time was not producing, the minerals were 
undiscovered, and the value of the mineral estate was unknown. 
III, Whether the statute of limitations bars any challenge to the MlY 2000 tax deed, despite no 
notice given to the Jordans? 
If the mineral estate was properly assessed by Uintah County, and a tax lien attached, the 
next question is whether the Jordans' constitutional challenge based on lack of notice is barred by 
the statute of limitations for tax deeds. 
The Jensens argue that any challenge to their purchase of the mineral estate at the May 
2000 tax sale is barred by the four-year statute of limitations. Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-2-206 bars 
any challenges to tax title after four years from the date of the sale. Section 206 states: 
an action or defense to recover, take possession of, quiet title to, or determine the 
ownership of real property may not be commenced against the holder of a tax title 
after the expiration of four years from the date of the sale, conveyance, or transfer of 
the tax title to any county, or directly to any other purchaser at any public or private 
sale. This section may not bar any action or defense by the owner of the legal title 
to the property which he or his predecessor actually occupied or possessed within 
four years from the commencement of an action or defense .... 
The Jensens have held the May 2000 tax title beyond the four-year period set forth in Section 
206. There is no argument that the Jordans did not actually possess the mineral estate at any time 
during the four-year time period between May 2000, and May 2004.3 
3The Court notes here the inequality the statute would create for owners of legal title to 
unproductive mineral estates, as they would never be able to show actual possession of an 
unproductive mineral estate. While it's not necessary to the outcome here, the Court finds that 
the Jordans exercised as much actual possession or control of the mineral estate as possible, by 
periodically leasing the minerals over the many years following the tax sale. 
11 
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The parties have offered extensive case law on this issue from a variety of jurisdictions. 
The Court has reviewed the cases cited in the Motions and supplemental pleadings and found 
them useful for gaining a general understanding of the law on this issue. Reliance on only two of 
the cases is necessary and sufficient for this decision. In Jones v. Flowers, 541 U.S. 220 (2006), 
the U.S. Supreme Court found that selling a person's property at a tax sale without notice was a 
violation of the person's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The Court determined that 
notice of the tax sale must be reasonably calculated to reach the intended person to be deemed 
constitutionally sufficient. Id. at 226; see also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 
339 U.S. 306,314 (1950). The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue of application of the 
tax title statute of limitations where the tax sale included a procedural error. Frederiksen v. 
LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah 1981). In Frederiksen, the Court upheld the application of the 
statute of limitations barring a challenge based on a procedural defect in the tax sale (the county 
auditor's appointment was not made in writing, and had failed to take an oath of office, as 
required by statute). The Court reasoned that the purpose of the statute of limitations was to 
provide certainness and fmality to tax sales, even if the sale was invalid because of procedural 
defects in the execution. Importantly for our purposes, however, is footnote 14 of the 
Frederiksen opinion, in which Justice Oaks stated in dicta, "We expressly reserve opinion on 
whether the special statute of limitations could protect a tax title acquired by means repugnant to 
fundamental fairness or whether such an application of the statute would exceed the limits of 
statutory intent or constitutional permissibility." Id. at 831, fn. 14. 
Here, the Jordans were not given notice of the 1995 assessment or any assessment 




given notice of the taxes levied after the severance. The general assessments made on the 
Jordans' property prior to the 1995 severance never explicitly included an assessment for the 
mineral estate. Neither the Jordans, nor their predecessors, were ever given notice of the May 
2000 tax sale. Uintah County had the addresses for the Jordans and their attorney. The County 
had previously sent tax notices for years prior to 199S to Olivia Jordan. 
The Court finds that this is one particular instance that Justice Oaks alluded to where the 
special statute of limitations does not apply. One of the most critical and fundamental due 
process rights is the right to notice, particularly when notice pertains to a government seizure of 
property. A statute of limitations that eliminates a person's right to challenge a tax sale, even 
when notice was not given, runs afoul of Constitutional protections. The facts here are not 
similar to those in Frediksen, where the error in the tax sale involved a minor procedural issue. 
The error here was substantive and significant. Consequently the tax deed was not merely 
voidable and subject to the statute of limitations, as the Jensens suggest. The tax deed is void 
because the lack of notice to the Jordans is a jurisdictional defect of the sale. Without 
jurisdiction, the statute of limitations did not start, let alone expire. Selling the Jordans' mineral 
interest at a tax sale without notice was an unconstitutional taking and a violation of due process. 
The Court finds that selling property at a county tax sale without any notice to the legal owner of 
the property is repugnant to fundamental fairness. 
Further, record notice does not absolved the Cowity of the problem. First, record notice 
does not satisfy the requirements outlined in Jones v. Flowers. Second, the record notice showed 
that the tax lien date was January 16, 1996, which all parties agree was a clerical error, but 
nonetheless would not have given the Jordans accurate notice that their mineral interest may be 
13 
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in jeopardy of being sold. The County also admits that the Uintah County Assessor did not 
assess the mineral rights in this case and did not believe he was required to do so. Therefore, 
even if the Jordans had reviewed the record and inquired of the County concerning a potential 
sale of their interest, the County would have affirmed that their property was not subject to the 
tax sale. Finally, an actual inspection of the land during the time of the tax sale or four years 
after would not have given the J ordans any indication that their mineral interest had been sold at 
a tax sale. There was no development on the overlying surface property, nor was there any 
physical evidence of production of the mineral interest. 
Because there was no actual notice of the tax sale, record notice was insufficient and 
inaccurate, and because there was no physical evidence to suggest to the J ordans that the property 
might have been sold, the Court fmds that the sale was repugnant to fundamental fairness. The 
sale, if intended to convey the severed mineral interests, was without due process of law, and 
resulted in an unconstitutional talcing. Consequently, pursuant to Frederiksen footnote 14, the 
statute of limitations does not apply to bar the Jordans' challenge to the tax sale. 
IV, Whether the heirs of Marie Robertson and Caroline Kelley have standing to assert the due 
process claims? 
Finally, the Jensens argue that the heirs of Marie Robertson and Caroline Kelley lack 
standing to assert the due process rights. Marie Robertson and Caroline Kelley passed away in 
2003 and 2002, respectively. Ms. Robertson's and Ms. Kelley's heirs are some of the Plaintiffs 
claiming and interest in the property. 





Div. o/Water Rights of Dep't a/Natural Res., 2010 UT 14,112,228 P.3d 747. "As a general 
rule, courts do not permit a party to assert the constitutional rights of a third party." Shelledy v. 
Lore, 836 P.2d 786, 789 (Utah 1992). "[A] litigant must assert his own legal rights and interests, 
and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." Id. 
However, "it has long been recognized that the surviving claims of a decedent must be 
pursued by a third party." Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 711 (1987). "[P]ennitting appellees to 
raise their decedent's claims is merely an extension of the common law's provision for 
appointment of a decedent's representative. It is therefore a 'settled practice of the courts' not 
open to objection on the ground that it permits a litigant to raise third parties' rights." Id. at 712. 
There are "two factors to be considered in determining when the third-party rule should 
be suspended: the relationship of the litigant to the person whose right he seeks to assert, and the 
ability of the third party to assert his own right." Irving v. Clark, 758 F.2d 1260, 118 (8th Cir. 
1985). In Lewis v. Grinker, 111 F. Supp 2d 142, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), the court explained: 
[m]oreover, as other courts have observed, the relationship between a parent and 
child is much closer than those involved in other cases in which third-party standing 
has been found to exist ... [t]he relationship between parent and child has been 
deemed to be "more than sufficient to address the concerns that underlie the 
prudential doctrine" of third-party standing. Elias v. United States Dep 't of State, 
721 F. Supp. 243, 246-47 (N.D.Cal. 1989). Other courts have permitted a child to 
assert his or her parent's equal protection rights in challenging the validity of statutes 
that conferred United States citizenship on the foreign-born offspring of United 
States citizen fathers, but not United States citizen mothers, see Wauchope v. United 
States Dep 't of State, 985 F .2d 1407, 1411 (9th Cir. 1993); Elisa, 721 F. Supp. at 246-
47, or which chilled the parent's right to adopt a child, see Lindley ex rel. Lindley v. 
Sullivan, 889 F .2d 124, 129 (7th Cir. 1989) ... Further, the effectiveness of a parent's 
representation of his or her child is reflected in the well-established tradition that 
permits parents to sue as the representatives of their minor children and to "maintain 
litigation that rests directly on the standing of the children themselves." 13 Wright 
et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3531.9 (2d ed. 1984); see 




Here, Marie Robertson and Caroline Kelley are deceased and cannot pursue their constitutional 
claims. As set forth above, they did not receive notice, and were not aware of their potential 
constitutional claims before they died. Because they did not receive notice, they were not able to 
pursue their constitutional claims before their deaths. The Plaintiffs, as heirs of Marie Robertson 
and Caroline Kelley, also did not receive notice of the assessment, taxes, or sale. 
As in Wauchope v. U.S. Dept. Of State, 156 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Cal. 1991), it is 
"undisputed Plaintiffs' interests are harmonious with and at least as strong as the interest that 
(their) mother would have asserted." The Plaintiffs, as children of Marie Robertson and Caroline 
Kelley, have a sufficiently close relationship to satisfy the relationship factor in the third-party 
standing test. The Court· finds that the Plaintiffs have third-party standing to assert the 
constitutional claims. 
Y, Whether Portions of Rolene Rasmussen's Affidavit should be Stricken? 
In a separate motion, but in conjunction with its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
Jensens moved the court to strike certain portions ofRolene Rasmussen's testimony contained in 
an affidavit. Jensens argue that the offending portions of the affidavit are legal conclusions not 
based upon personal knowledge, rather than statements of fact. The particular paragraphs 
complained of read as follows: 
6. The Uintah County Assessor's office does not assess mineral rights. Mineral rights are 
handled by the Utah State Tax Commission. 





have been part of the Uintah County assessment of the Property in 1995 or any years thereafter. 
9. Mineral rights are not included in any appraisal of real property by the Uintah County 
Appraiser's office since the mineral rights are not assessed by the county. 
The Court finds that the statements can be read either as statements of fact or as legal 
conclusions. The statement that the Uintah County Assessor's office does not assess mineral 
rights can be taken as a statement of fact if Rasmussen has knowledge that the office makes no 
attempt to value or assess mineral rights. Further, if Rasmussen knows that the office doesn't 
separately assess mineral rights that have been severed from surface rights, such is a statement of 
fact. Finally, if Rasmussen knows that appraisers in Uintah County don't attempt to value 
minerals when performing appraisals for assessment purposes, such is a statement of fact. The 
Court accepts Rasmussen's statement to establish these facts. 
To the extent that Rasmussen's statement attempts to reach the ultimate legal conclusions 
in this case, the Court disregards Rasmussen's statement for that purpose. 
The Jordans' and Axia's Motions for Summary Judgment are granted. The Jensen's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. The Court quiets title to the mineral interest in the 
Jordans. Pursuant to Code v. Utah Dept. of Health, 162 P.3d 1097 (Utah 2007), and Utah R. Civ. 
P. 7(f)(2), the parties are notified that this is the final ruling and order in this case. The parties 
need not prepare or submit any other order. 
Dated this (6 day of_~h-~---- ' 2015. 
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BY THE COURT: 
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James Harvey Jordan, Trustee 
of the James H. Jordan 
Revocable Trust dated June 1, 
2007, 
Martha Jordan Boright, 
Mary Edna Jordan, 
Michael C. Kelley and 
Jary Anne Kelley, Trustees 
of the Kelley Joint Trust 
dated January 7, 2013, 
Garey E. Kelley, 
Norma Stroud Dickey, 
Mara Beth Harner, 
Jan Rhodes as Trustee of the 
Revocable Rhodes Family 
Living Trust dated April 19, 
2005, 
Wendy Sue Pack, 
Craig Mcsorley, 









(October 29, 2013 hearing) 
Civil No.: 130800084 
Judge: Edwin T. Peterson 
The above captioned matter came before the Court on October 
29, 2013 for argument on the Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss the 
first Count Fifth (Utah Code Ann. §40-1-12) in the Defendants 
Counter Claim and the Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend 
2 
November 13, 2013 11 :42 AM 2 of4 
r" ~ 
Counterclaim and Request for Revised Notice of Event Due Dates 
(the "Motion to Amend"). 
Plaintiffs were represented by their attorney, Clark 
Allred. Defendants 
attorney Matthew E. 
were present and represented by their 
Jensen. Having read the relevant memoranda 
and after hearing oral argument from counsel the court stated on 
the record its reasoning and based thereon: 
Orders as follows: 
1. The Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss the first Count 
Fifth of the Counterclaim based on Utah Code Ann. §40-1-12 is 
granted and that cause of action is dismissed. 
2. Based on stipulation of counsel on the record, the 
Motion to Amend is withdrawn. 
3. For purposes of scheduling and discovery only, this 
matter will proceed as if a Tier 2 case under Rule 2 6 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. For all other purposes, 
including allowable damages, this case will be considered a Tier 
3 case under Rules 8 and 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. If either party needs more discovery than is allowed 
under tier II they can request the court for leave to conduct 
additional discovery. 
3 
November 13, 2013 11 :42 AM 3 of 4 
DATED this day of November, 2013. 
Approved as to form: 
/s/ Matthew E. Jensen 
Signed by Clark Allred 
with permission of 
Matthew E. Jensen, 
Attorney for Defendants 
November 13, 2013 11;42 AM 
BY THE COURT 
Edwin T. Peterson 
District Court Judge 
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891 MINES AND MINING 40-6-9 
owners within the unit area and shall be the property of the 
owners in tbe proportion that the expenses of unit operations 
ire charged, unless otherwise provided in the plan of unit 
opemtion. 
(12) This section shall apply only to field or pool units and 
;hall not apply to the unitization of interests within a drilling 
anit as may be authorized and governed under the provisions 
ofSection 40-6-6. 20 12 
40-6-9. Proceeds from sale of production - Payment of 
proceeds - Requirements - Proceeding on 
pe tition to determine cause of nonpayment -
Remedies - Penalties. 
(l){a) The oil and gas proceeds derived from the sale of 
production from any well producing oil or gas in the state 
shall be paid to any p'erson legally entitled to the payment of 
the proceeds not later than 180 days after the first day of the 
month following the date of the first sale and thereafter not 
later than 30 days after the end of the calendar month 
within which payment is received by the payor for produc-
tion, unless other periods or arrangements are provided for 
in a valid contract with the person entitled to the proceeds. 
(b) The payment shall be made directly to the person 
entitled to the payment by the payor. 
(c) The payment is considered to have been made upon 
deposit in the United States mail. 
(2) Payments shall be remitted to any person entitled to oil 
and gas proceeds annually for the aggregate of up to 12 
months accumulation of proceeds, if the total amount owed is 
$100 or less. 
(3)(a) Any delay in determining whether a person is legally 
entitled to an interest in the oil and gas proceeds does not 
affect payments to other persons entitled to payment. 
1 (b) (i) If accrued payments cannot be made within the 
I 
time limits specified in Subsection (1) or (2), the payor 
shall deposit all oil and gas proceeds credited to the 
eventual oil and gas proceeds owner to an escrow account 
_
1 
in a federally insured bank or savings and loan institution 
J using a standard escrow document form. 
j (ii) The deposit shall earn interest at the highest rate a being offered by that institution for the amount and term 
1 of similar demand deposits. 
l (iii) The escrow agent may commingle money received into escrow from any one lessee or operator, purchaser, or other person legally responsible for payment. (iv) Payment of principal and accrued interest from the escrow account shall be made by the escrow agent to 
the person legally entitled to them within 30 days from 
the date of receipt by the escrow agent of final legal 
deternunation of entitlement to the payment. 
(v) Applicable escrow fees shall be deducted from the 
payments. 
(4) Any person entitled to oil and gas proceeds may file a 
petition with the board to conduct a hearing to determine why 
the proceeds have not been paid. 
(5) Upon receipt of the petit ion, the board shall set the 
matter for investigation and negotiation by the division within 
60 days. 
(6)(a) If the matter cannot be resolved by negotiation as of 
that date, the board may set a hearing within 30 days. 
(b) If the board does not set a hearing, ru1y information 
gathered during the investigation and negotiation shall be 
given to the petitioner who may then seek a remedy in a 
court of competent jurisdiction. 
(7)(a) If, after a hearing, the board finds the proceeds have 
not been deposited in an interest bearing escrow account in 
accordance with Subsection (3), the board may order that; 
{i) a complete accounting be made; and 
(ii) the proceeds be subject to an interest rate of 
1-1/2% per month, as a substitute for an escrow account 
interest rate, accruing from the date the payment should 
have been suspended in accordance with Subsection (3). 
(b) If, after a hearing, the board finds the delay of 
payment is ,vithout reasonable justification, the board may; 
(i} if the proceeds have been deposited in an interest 
beru-ing escrow account in accordance ,vith Subsection (3): 
(A) order a complete accounting; 
(B) require the proceeds and accruing interest to 
remain in the escrow account; and 
(C) assess a penalty ofup to 25% of the total proceeds 
and interest in the escrow account; or 
(ii) if the proceeds have not been deposited in an 
interest bearing escrow account in accordance with Sub-
section (3), assess a penalty of up to 25% of the total 
proceeds and interest as determined under Subsection 
(7)(a). 
(c) (i) Upon finding that the delay of payment is without 
reasonable justification, the board shall set a date not 
later than 90 days from the hearing for final distribution 
of the total sum. 
(ii) If payment is not made by the required date, the 
total proceeds, interest, and any penalty as provided in 
Subsection (7)(b) shall be subject to interest at a rate of 
1-1/2% per month until paid. 
(d) If, after a hearing, the board finds the delay of 
payment is with reasonable justification and the proceeds· 
have been deposited in an interest bearing escrow account 
in accordance with Subsection (3), the payor may not be 
required to make an accounting or payment of appropriately 
suspended proceeds until the condition which justified sus-
pension has been satisfied. 
(8) The circumstances under which the board may find the 
suspension of payment of proceeds is made with reasonable 
justification, such that the penalty provisions of Subsections 
(7)(b) and (7)(c)(ii) do not apply, include, but are not limited to, 
the following: 
(a) the payor: 
(i) fails to make the payment in good faith reliance 
upon a title opinion by a licensed Utah attorney objecting 
to the lack of good and marketable title of record of the 
person claiming entitlement to payment; and 
(ii) furnishes a copy of the relevant portions of the 
opinion to the person for necessary curative action; 
(b) the payor receives information which: 
(i) in the payor's good faith judgment, brings into 
question the entitlement of the person claiming the right 
to the payment to receive that payment; 
(ii) has rendered the title unmarketable; or 
(iii) may expose the payor to the risk of liability to 
third parties if the payment is made; 
(c) the total amount of oil and gas proceeds in possession 
of the payor owed to the person making claim to payment is 
less than $100 at the end of any month; or 
(d) the person entitled to payment has failed or refused to 
execute a division or transfer order acknowledging the 
proper interest to which the person claims to be entitled and 
setting forth the mailing address to which payment may be 
directed, provided the division or transfer order does not 
alter or amend the terms of the lease. 
(9) If the circumstances described in Subsection (S)(a) or (b) 
arise, the payor may: 
(a) suspend and escrow the payments in accordance with 
Subsection (3); or 
(b) at the request and expense of the person claiming 
entitlement to the payment, make the payment into court 
on an interpleader action to resolve the claim and avoid 
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103-66 or other federal law, a statement that the fee was 
paid in a timely manner. 
(3) The affidavit, or a certified copy, shall be prima facie 
evidence of the facts stated in the affidavit. 
(4) The amendments made in this section do not affect any 
act or right accruing or which has accrued or been established 
or any suit or proceeding commenced before May 1, 1995. 1990 
40-1-7. District 1·ecorders - Office abolished. 
From and after the terminat ion of the office of any mining 
district recorder now holding office in this state such district 
shall be abolished and such office shall become vacant. 1033 
40-1-8. Vacancy and removal - County recorder to 
receive records. 
(1) If there is a vacancy in the office of recorder of any 
mining district, or if there is no person in the mining district 
authorized to retain the custody and give certified copies of the 
records, the person having custody of the records shall deposit 
them in the office of the county recorder of the county in which 
the mining district, or the greater part of the mining district, 
is situated. 
(2) That county recorde r shall take possession of the re-
cords and may make and certify copies from the records, 
including any other copies of records and papers in the 
recorder's office pertaining to mining claims. 
(3) Those certified copies sha ll be receivable in evidence in 
all cou'r ts and before all officers and t ribuna ls . 
(4) The production of a certified copy shall be, without 
furthe r proof, evidence that the records were properly in the 
custody of the county recorder. 1990 
40-1-9. Coun ty recorder may certify district records. 
(1) When the books, records, and documents pertaining to 
the office of mining district recorder have been deposited in 
the office of a county recorder, the recorder may make and 
certify copies from those records. 
(2) Those certified copies shall be receivable in all tribunals 
and before all officers of this state in the same manner and to 
the same effect as if the records had been originally filed or 
made in the office of the county recorder. 1909 
40-1-10. Certified copies of records evidence. 
Copies of notices of location of mining claims, mill sites and 
tunnel sites heretofore recorded in the records of the several 
mining districts, and copies of the mining rules and regula-
t ions in force therein and recorded, when duly certified by the 
district or county recorder, shall be receivable in a ll tribunals 
and before a ll officers of this state as prima facie evidence. 
1033 
40-1-11. Interfering with notices, stakes, or monuments 
- Penalty. 
Any person who intentionally or knowingly tears· down or 
defaces a notice posted on a mining claim, or takes up or 
destroys any stake or monument marking the claim, or 
interferes with any person lawfully in possession of the clajm, 
or who alters, erases, defaces, or destroys any record kept by 
a mining district or county recorder, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine of not less than 
$25 nor more than $100, or by imprisonment for not less than 
10 days nor more than six months , or by both the fine and 
imprisonment. 2001 
40-1 -12. Damages for wrongful removal of ores. 
When damages are claimed for the extraction or selling of 
ore from any mine or mining claim and the defendant, or those 
under whom he claims, holds, under color of title adverse to 
the claims of the plaintiff, in good faith, then the reasonable 
value of all labor bestowed or expenses incurred in necessary 
developing, mining, transporting, concentrating, selling or 
preparing said ore, or its mineral content, for market, must be 
a llowed as an offset against s uch damages; provided, however, 
that any person who, wrongfully entering upon any mine or 
mining claim and carrying away ores therefrom, or wrongfully 
extracting and selling ores from any mine, having knowledge 
of the existence of adverse claimants in any mine or mining 
claim, and without notice to them, knowingly and willfully 
trespasses in or upon such mine or mining claim and extracts 
or sells ore the refrom shall be liable to the owners of s uch ore 
for three times the value thereof without any deductions 
either for labor bestowed or expenses incurred jn removing, 
transporting, selling or preparing said ore, or its mineral 
content for market. 1943 
40-1-13. Re peale d. 
CHAPTER2 
COAL MINE SAFETY ACT 
Section 



















Scope and administration of chapter. 
Rulemaking authority. 
Part 2 
Utah Office of Coal Mine Safety 
Utah Office of Coal Mine Safety created. 
Appointment of director. 
Mine Safety Technical Advisory Council cre-
a ted - Duties . 
Coal Miner Certification Panel created -
Duties. 
Utah Research Institute for Mine Safety and 
Productivity - Designation - Duties. 
Part 3 
Safety Conditions 
Commission and office responsibilities. 
Reporting of an unsafe condition in coal 
mines - Adverse action prohibited. 
Annual report on coal mine safety. 
Part4 
Certification of Coal Miners 
Necessity of certificate. 
Certification requirements. 
40-2-1 to 40-2-17. Repealed/Renumbered. 
PART 1 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
40-2-101. Title . 
This chapter is known as the "Coal Mjne Safety Act." 200s 
40-2-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 


